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The Hands and Brains of Digital Culture. Arguments for an Inclusive 
Approach to Cultural Labour. 
Marisol Sandoval 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Since the early 1970s theories of the “information revolution” (Dyer-Witheford  
1999) have celebrated techno-scientific development as essential driving force 
of fundamental socio-economic transformations, allegedly leading to a new 
society that overcomes the negative features of industrial capitalism. Peter 
Drucker’s “age of discontinuity” (1969), Zbigniew Brzezinski’s “technetronic era” 
(1970), Daniel Bell’s “post-industrial society” (1974), Marc Porat’s “information 
economy” (1977) or Alvin Toffler’s “third wave” (1980) put forward a vision of a 
society organized around knowledge and information in which creativity, 
equality and the prevalence of high skilled knowledge work would replace 
alienated and exploited labour (Dyer-Witheford, 1999, 25). More recently 
Richard Florida has continued these debates, arguing that based on technology, 
talent and tolerance the “creative class” would be “the mobilising force today – 
the leading force at the beachhead of social, cultural, and economic change” 
(Florida 2012, xv) bringing in its wake a clean and green, sustainable, open and 
tolerant “creative economy“ (Florida 2012, x). 
 
These theories have in common that they not only attest a shift from manual to 
mental activities as dominant forms of wealth creation, but also stress the 
transformatory power of knowledge, information or creative work, making 
social struggles obsolete. They create the impression that we live in an 
information society in which the majority of labour and goods have become 
immaterial. 
 
A focus on mental as opposed to manual labour also characterizes much of the 
debate on cultural work, which tends to be understood as the creative work of 
“symbol creators” (Hesmondhalgh 2013, 20). Hesmondhalgh and Baker (2011, 
382) for example define cultural work as “those forms of labour with an 
especially strong element of aesthetic, expressive and symbolic making”. They 
oppose a broad definition of cultural work because it ”risks eliminating the 
specific importance of culture, of mediated communication, and of the content of 
communication products” (Hesmondhalgh and Baker 2011, 60). According to 
Hesmondhalgh cultural labour deals “primarily with the industrial production 
and circulation of texts” (Hesmondhalgh 2013, 17). Just like in information 
society theory, concepts of cultural work and the cultural industries that 
foreground content production tend to approach culture as something 
immaterial.  
 
In this paper I problematise the tendency to regard cultural work as exclusively 
immaterial, mental or symbolic work. I first argue that we should consider both 
the hands and brains of cultural production in order to avoid mystifying the 
materiality of digital culture. Using Raymond Williams’ cultural materialism as 
analytical framework I then discuss specific examples that illustrate the social 
and environmental impacts of contemporary culture. I highlight that in political 
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terms an inclusive approach to cultural labour is important as it can confront 
individualisation and inform solidarity across national and occupational 
boundaries. Finally, I conclude with some remarks on the meaning of work and 
the division of labour and suggest starting points for rethinking it.  
 
 
2. The hands and brains of cultural production 
 
The theories of the information revolution, which started to shift attention from 
manual to mental production, were developed during times of capitalist crisis 
and social transformation. One political-economic response to the crisis of 
Fordist capitalism in the 1970s was the gradual relocation of large parts of 
production activities from the industrialized core of the world economy to the 
former periphery, supported by neoliberal deregulations and trade 
liberalisations (Fröbel, Heinrichs and Kreye 1981; Smith 2012, 40; Harvey 2005, 
Munck 2002, 45).  
 
Fröbel, Heinrichs and Kreye have described this development as “new 
international division of labour” (NIDL). To satisfy the corporate desire for cheap 
labour, commodity production became “increasingly subdivided into fragments 
which can be assigned to whichever part of the world can provide the most 
profitable combination of capital and labour” (Fröbel, Heinrichs and Kreye 1981, 
15). The result was the emergence of global value chains and production 
networks in various industries. Among them also the electronics sector, an 
industry that is essential for the production of cultural technologies such as 
computers, video, film and music equipment, printers, photo cameras, media 
players etc.  
 
Most everyday uses of culture today – from online newspapers to music 
streaming, digital film and music production, content editing, multimedia art, 
social media culture, digital photography – would be unthinkable without 
computer technologies and consumer electronics. While the industrial 
manufacturing of technological hardware remained crucial for cultural 
production and consumption, it also was outsourced to low-wage countries in 
Asia, Eastern Europe and South America and thus became increasingly invisible 
in the West. 
 
Thus, while theorists of the information revolution were right to highlight the 
huge impacts of technological development on the organization of social life, this 
development did not mean the dissolution of physical, industrial production. 
Quite on the contrary, increased importance of computer technologies in the 
field of culture, eventually giving rise to digital culture, meant that its production 
and consumption became increasingly based on high-tech equipment. As Eric 
Howbsbawm highlights, cultural history has always also been a history of 
technological development: “What characterizes the arts in our century is their 
dependence on, and their transformation by, the historically unique 
technological revolution, particularly the technologies of communication and 
reproduction. For the second force that has revolutionised culture, that of the 
mass consumer society, is unthinkable without the technological revolution, for 
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example without film, without radio, without television, without portable sound 
in your shirt pocket” (Hobsbawm 2013, 9f).  
 
The political-economic context of outsourced industrial production mixed with 
ideological hopes about a frictionless information society contributed to a myth 
of digital culture as weightless, immaterial and sustainable. Concepts such as 
“digital sublime” (Mosco 2004) or “technological sublime” (Maxwell and Miller 
2012, 7) suggest that certain utopian ideals are attached to media and 
communication technologies. Maxwell and Miller argue that as a consequence 
the “way technology is experienced in daily life is far removed from the physical 
work and material resources that go into it” (Maxwell and Miller 2012, 7). The 
clean, immaculate and advanced surface of modern computer products hides the 
dirty reality of their production process. 
 
Nick Dyer-Witheford therefore describes the value chain as “the dirty secret of 
the digital revolution” (Dyer-Witheford 2014, 169). Part of this “dirty secret” is 
that “the global information economy is built in part on the backs of tens of 
millions Chinese industrial workers” (Zhao and Duffy 2008, 229). 
Conceptualizing cultural labour only as mental and immaterial labour neglects 
the fact that it is underpinned by the availability of digital technologies whose 
production requires physical and manual labour.  
 
A more inclusive approach to cultural labour can capture both the mental and 
manual labour that help to produce digital culture today. Vincent Mosco and 
Catherine McKercher suggested a broad definition of knowledge work that 
includes “anyone in the chain of producing and distributing knowledge products. 
In this view, the low-wage women workers in Silicon Valley and abroad who 
manufacture and assemble cables and electronic components are knowledge 
workers because they are an integral part of the value chain that results in the 
manufacturing of the central engine of knowledge production: the computer” 
(Mosco and McKercher 2009, 25). Similarly Hong (2011, 11) argues that “in the 
context of information and communications, we actually need to extend the 
concept of the ‘knowledge worker’ to include manual and industrial workers 
who are also essential to this industry”. 
 
Considering both the hands and the brains of cultural production can avoid a 
cultural idealism that regards culture as merely immaterial and symbolic as well 
as a western centric-perspective that hides the various forms of labour involved 
in the global production of digital culture. Such an alternative perspective can be 
based on Raymond Williams’ cultural materialism. 
 
 
3. Cultural materialism 
 
Raymond Williams developed a materialist critique of the tendency to see 
culture as “dependent, secondary, ‘superstructural’: a realm of ‘mere’ ideas, 
beliefs, arts, customs, determined by the basic material history” (Williams 1977, 
19). He argued that many discussions of the relationship between culture and 
economy, evolving around concepts such as reflection, reproduction, mediation, 
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homolog, often are problematic not because they are too economistic and 
materialist but quite on the contrary, because they are not “materialist enough” 
(Williams 1977, 92). Instead of the idealist “separation of ‘culture’ from material 
social life” (Williams 1977, 19) William’s suggested a cultural materialism that 
emphasises “cultural practices as from the beginning social and material” 
(Williams 1990, 206).  
 
Williams’s approach builds on the materialist insight that ideas are always part 
of material life processes. Marx and Engels for example highlighted that the 
“production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly 
interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men” 
(Marx and Engels 1845/46, 42). Similarly Gramsci’s work is based on the insight 
that “ideas are themselves material forces” (Gramsci 1988, 215).  
 
Beyond acknowledging the materiality of ideas, Williams’ approach also 
highlights the importance of considering the materiality of technologies that 
enable cultural production at a given historical stage. He criticises the “rhetorical 
isolation of ‘mass communications’ from the complex historical development of 
the means of communication as intrinsic, related and determined parts of the 
whole historical social and material process” (Williams 1980/2005 52). Williams 
therefore foregrounds the need to recognise that “the productive forces of 
‘mental labour’ have, in themselves, an inescapable material and thus social 
history” (Williams 1990, 211).  
 
A cultural materialist perspective thus means to consider the social and material 
history of the means of cultural production. Applying this perspective to the 
study of cultural labour pays attention to the work of mineral miners, workers in 
technology manufacturing and waste workers in electronics dumping grounds. 
As Williams highlights, cultural production “was, and is, co-operative material 
production involving many processes of a material and physical kind” (Williams 
1977, 163). 
 
William’s argument thus suggests appreciating culture as a totality that connects 
physical and ideational production processes. A broad perspective on cultural 
labour can help focussing attention also on the dark side of digital culture and 
acknowledge its widespread social and environmental implications.  
 
 
4. De-mystifying digital culture: the dark side of consumer electronics 
 
In 2010 the tragic suicides of 17 young workers at Apple’s supplier factory 
Foxconn1 (FinnWatch, SACOM and SOMO 2011, 8; Wired Magazine 20112) for a 
                                                        
1 Foxconn is the trading name of the Taiwanese electronics manufacturing 
company Hon Hai Precision Industry Co. Ltd 
2 Wired Magazine. 2011. 1 Million Workers. 90 Million iPhones. 17 Suicides. 
Who’s to blame? By Joel Johnson on February 28, 2011. Retrieved from 
http://www.wired.com/magazine/2011/02/ff_joelinchina/all/1 on October 23, 
2011. 
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moment lifted the veil of ignorance and revealed the harsh labour reality in 
electronics manufacturing. In May and June 2010 many major Western media 
were looking behind the surface of bright and shiny computer products. They 
reported about bad working conditions and desperate workers at factories, 
which are supplying Western brands with tablets, computers, mobile phones or 
cameras that are sold to millions of customers. The New York Times for example 
published an article titled String of Suicides Continues at Electronics Supplier in 
China3; the BBC reported on Foxconn Suicides: ‘Workers Feel Quite Lonely’4, Time 
Magazine published a piece headed Chinese Factory Under Scrutiny As Suicides 
Mount5; The Guardian headlined Latest Foxconn Suicide Raises Concern Over 
Factory Life in China6, and CNN reported Inside China Factory Hit By Suicides7.  
 
However, it did not take long until public attention paid to Apple’s dirty secret 
started to dissipate and the company’s reputation continued to flourish. In 2014 
Fortune Magazine ranked Apple as the most admired company in the world – for 
the seventh year in a row8. The consultancy firm Reputation Institute based on 
the perception 55,000 people in 15 countries ranked Apple as the 5th most 
socially responsible company worldwide in 2014 (Reputation Institute 2014, 7). 
In earlier years Apple had been placed on rank 12 in 2013, rank 5 in 2012 and 
rank 2 in 2011 (Reputation Institute 2012, 19; 2013, 17). 
 
Apple’s image continues to be in stark contrast to evidence produced by 
corporate watch organisations during the past decade. Investigative research 
conducted by organisations such as Students and Scholars Against Corporate 
Misbehaviour (SACOM), China Labour Watch (CLW), Swedwatch or the Centre 
for Research on Multinational Corporations (SOMO) for many years has 
documented unacceptable working conditions at Foxconn as well as various 
                                                        
3 The New York Times. 2010. String of Suicides Continues at Electronics Supplier 
in China. By David Barboza on May 25, 2010. Retrieved from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/26/technology/26suicide.html on October 
24, 2011. 
4 BBC. 2010. Foxconn Suicides: ‘Workers Feel Quite Lonely. On May 28, 2010. 
Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10182824 on October 24, 2011. 
5 Time Magazine. 2010. Chinese Factory Under Scrutiny As Suicides Mount. On 
May 26, 2010. Retrieved from 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1991620,00.html on October 
24, 2011. 
6 The Guardian. 2010. Latest Foxconn Suicide Raises Concern Over Factory Life 
in China. By Tania Branigan on May 17, 2010. Retrieved from 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/may/17/foxconn-suicide-china-
factory-life on October 24, 2011. 
7 CNN. 2010. Inside China Factory Hit By Suicides. By John Vause on June 1, 2010. 
Retrieved from http://articles.cnn.com/2010-06-
01/world/china.foxconn.inside.factory_1_foxconn-suicides-china-labor-
bulletin?_s=PM:WORLD on October 24, 2011. 
 
8 Fortune Magazine. http://fortune.com/worlds-most-admired-companies/ 
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Apple supplier factories (see Sandoval 2014). In 2014, CLW and Green America 
(2014) in a joint report on Apple’s supplier Catcher Technology Co. Ltd for 
example found labour rights violations in regard to hiring practices, health and 
safety, working hours, wages, management, worker representation, student 
labour and living conditions. The report highlights Apple’s continued 
unwillingness to improve working conditions in its supply chain: “The ongoing 
and serious labor violations at Catcher bring into question the credibility of 
Apple’s Code of Conduct. Nearly 10 years have passed since Apple unveiled its 
list of human rights commitments, yet while Apple has earned hundreds of 
billions of dollars in profit over this period, the workers making Apple’s valuable 
gadgets continue to suffer daily human rights and safety violations” (CLW and 
Green America 2014, 8) 
 
Clearly, Apple is not an exception and inhumane working conditions persist 
throughout the supply chain of consumer electronics  (see Sandoval and Bjurling 
2013). In a recent report on the state of working conditions in the electronics 
supply chain, Electronics Watch highlights that common problems in the sector 
continue to include “poor wages; excessive working hours; risky working 
conditions due to the increase of temporary agency workers; discrimination 
against student and migrant workers; and a lack of safety precautions for the use 
of hazardous substances” (Electronics Watch Consortium 2014, 7). High pricing 
competition in the electronics market, rapid turnover of products, high profit 
margins for brand companies and the absence of more ethical alternatives to 
these brands accelerate these problems (Electronics Watch Consortium 2014, 
7f). 
 
Apart from shedding light on working conditions in the production of cultural 
technologies, a cultural materialist perspective also recognises and assesses the 
environmental impacts of digital culture resulting for example from energy use 
and electronic waste. Despite its airy and light-sounding label, cloud computing 
consumes huge amounts of energy worldwide. Greenpeace (2014, 10) calculates 
that the aggregate electricity demand of cloud computing in 2011 amounted to 
684 billion kWh, which is more than the annual national energy consumption of 
countries such as Germany, Canada or Brazil (Greenpeace 2014, 11).  
 
Apart from greenhouse gas emissions, digital culture is also impacting the 
environment through the inadequate disposal of increasing amounts of no longer 
functioning or unwanted cultural gadgets. According to the Solving the e-Waste 
Problem (StEP) Initiative, 48.9 million metric tonnes of eWaste were produced 
worldwide in 2012, amounting to 7kg per person on earth9. StEP Initiative 
furthermore calculates that the amount of e-Waste until 2017 will rise by 33 
percent to 65.4 million tonnes10.  
                                                        
9 StEP. Overview of Waste Related Information. World. Online http://www.step-
initiative.org/index.php/overview-world.html accessed on January 29, 2015 
10 StEP. 2013. E-Waste World Map reveals National Volumes, International 
Flows. Online: http://www.step-
initiative.org/index.php/newsdetails/items/world-e-waste-map-reveals-
national-volumes-international-flows.html accessed on January 29, 2015.  
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Electronics products can contain up to 60 elements, many of which are toxic 
(UNEP 2009, 6) such as mercury, lead, cadmium, barium or beryllium. Due to 
ineffective recycling techniques, limited take-back programmes and illegal 
exports of e-waste to developing countries, these resources often cannot be 
extracted for reuse (UNEP 2009, 6). The dismantling of electronics products in 
the informal recycling sector often results in an uncontrolled release of 
hazardous substances (e.g. trough incineration), which pollute the environment 
and pose serious health threats to recycling workers and local communities 
(UNEP 2009, 12).  
 
Waste workers risk being exposed to heavy metals (e.g. lead, cadmium, mercury) 
as well as various toxic fumes that are released through burning or melting 
electronic parts, such as toxic dioxin emissions from burning wires insulated 
with polyvinyl chloride (Maxwell and Miller 2012, 105).  As DanWatch reports, 
exposure to e-Waste can cause cuts, coughs, headaches, upper respiratory 
problems, rashes and burns as well as long term health conditions including 
infertility, miscarriage, tumors, endocrine diseases and birth defects (DanWatch 
2011, 6). 
 
Looking ahead, the amount of technology used for the production and 
consumption of culture will increase in the future if the current path of 
development continues. Research on digital culture should no longer ignore the 
often slave-like working conditions of miners who are extracting precious metals 
and minerals, or the lives of often young female migrant workers in China, who 
are moving to Special Economic Zones for finding employment in a factory to 
support their families, or the health problems of waste work on electronic 
dumping grounds. 
 
An inclusive understanding of cultural labour based on a cultural materialist 
perspective does not mean to eradicate the distinction between mental and 
physical labour. Both have distinct qualities and it is still possible and useful to 
distinguish between physical cultural work and informational cultural work 
(Fuchs and Sandoval 2014). However, an inclusive perspective has the advantage 
of not just looking at differences but also commonalities between the mental and 
physical forms of labour that are needed for the production of (digital) cultural 
goods. Opening up the discussion on cultural labour thus is a first step for 
identifying possible moments of solidarity between workers and consumers in 
the global network of cultural production.  
 
 
5. Digital culture and global solidarity  
 
The myths that surround digital technology (Mosco 2004; Maxwell and Miller 
2012, 7) not only tend to obscure its social and environmental impacts but also 
the economics of the cultural industry. The business of multinational digital 
cultural corporations such as Apple or Google depends on combinations of 
content, designs or software with hardware such as mobile phones, tablets and 
computers. They exploit diverse forms of both physical and informational labour.  
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Apple is not just a hardware producer. The success of its gadgets for example 
evolves around an elaborate integration of design, software and hardware. 
Likewise, Google is not just handling information. Its business segments include 
“search and display advertising, the Android operating system platform, 
consumer content through Google Play, enterprise commerce and hardware 
products” (Google 2013, 3). 
 
Since 2010 Google has been producing smartphones and tablets under the 
Google Nexus brand. It has outsourced the manufacturing of its Nexus products 
to other hardware companies including HTC, Samsung and LG. Motorola 
Mobility, which Google acquired in 2011 and sold to Lenovo in 2014, organised 
the manufacturing of the latest versions of Google’s smartphone Nexus 7 and 
tablet Nexus 911. However, where and how Google’s hardware is manufactured 
remains largely obscure. In 2012 Google announced that its Nexus media player 
would be manufactured in the US (Markoff 2012). In its 2013 annual report 
Google states “the vast majority of our Motorola products (other than some 
prototypes) are manufactured outside the U.S. primarily in China and Brazil” 
(Google 2013, 55). 
 
As Google is keeping its contract manufacturers secret, very little is known about 
the conditions under which its gadgets are produced. In summer 2013, while 
Motorola was Google’s subsidiary, SACOM (2013) investigated Biel Crystal’s 
factory in Huizhou, China, a company, which is supplying electronics brands with 
cover glasses for phones and tablets. Among its customers are Apple, Samsung 
and also Motorola. The working conditions SACOM found are similar to those 
across the electronics manufacturing sector. Workers did not receive clear work 
contracts, they worked excessive overtime, were exposed to serious health risks, 
military management styles, unpunctual wages and denial of social security 
benefits.  
 
However, Google is not only producing smartphones and tablets but according to 
Wired Magazine since 2000 has also been designing and building its own servers 
in China and Taiwan (Metz 2012). Chief Financial Officer Patrick Pichette at 
Google’s annual stockholder meeting in 2012 confirmed “Google actually builds 
servers in a factory”, stressing that “There’s a bit of a mythology that Google 
doesn’t know anything about hardware” (Pichette cited in McMillan 2012). 
Confronting this myth Pichette clarifies:  “We’re big in hardware. Google actually 
builds servers in a factory that actually probably makes us one of the largest 
hardware manufacturers in the world. And so we know hardware. We know 
about flash. We know about equipment. We know about supply chain. So we 
were very well-equipped from the hardware side, to be very competitive in that 
space” (Pichette cited in McMillan 2012).  The example of Google illustrates the 
complex political economy of digital culture, which pulls together ideational and 
physical production.  
 
                                                        
11 BBC. 2014. Google Sells Motorola to Lenovo for $3bn. Online: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-25956284 accessed on January 20, 2015.  
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While Google’s corporate power extends across national and occupational 
boundaries, workers’ experiences are predominantly local and separated from 
each other. This separation limits their ability to confront Google’s global power. 
A worker movement that is based on international solidarity and co-ordinated 
resistance could create possibilities for challenging Google by simultaneously 
disrupting several nodes in its transnational production network.  
 
Mosco and McKercher stress: “A more heterogeneous vision of the knowledge-
work category points to another type of politics, one predicated on questions 
about whether knowledge workers can unite across occupational or national 
boundaries, whether they can maintain their new-found solidarity, and what 
they should do with it” (Mosco and McKercher 2009, 26). Encouraging solidarity 
seems crucial in order to reinvigorate a labour movement that over the past 
decades has been substantially weakened through neoliberal policies, the global 
fragmentation of production and the normalisation of precarious and flexible 
work and employment  (McGuigan 2010, Mosco 2011, de Peuter 2011, 42). As 
Mosco (2011) has argued, precarious labour, global exploitation, technological 
and corporate convergence can only be confronted by a global and inclusive 
labour movement. 
 
This leads to the key question how to create a sense of solidarity and shared 
interest between workers whose working lives appear to have little in common. 
In fact, the differences could hardly seem any bigger between the physically 
strenuous and dangerous bodily labour of mineral miners and the brain work of 
well paid software engineers in playful office buildings; the creative labour of 
designers and the repetitive work routines of assembly line workers; the flexible 
working hours of digital content editors and dangerous lives of waste workers 
on electronics dumping grounds; the strictly monitored performance of call 
centre workers and the prosumer labour in teenage bedrooms etc.  Exploring 
and understanding the particularities of these distinctive forms of work is 
important. However, keeping alive the possibility of solidarity between the 
various workers contributing digital cultural production also requires 
investigating their commonalities.    
 
Let us for example consider manual electronics assembly work and creative 
content production. One commonality between them is precariousness. The 
fundamental insecurity and uncertainty (Standing 2011, 10) of precarious labour 
can be found at various stages of the global digital production network. It affects 
the worker in an electronics assembly plant without clear work contract who can 
be fired at any time (Swedwatch and SOMO 2011, 36, SOMO 2009, 30), as well as 
the web designer who moves from one short-term contract to the next, or the 
freelance journalist always looking for the next job (Gill 2011, Ross 2006/7, 13, 
2008, de Peuter 2011, 419).  Feelings of insecurity and anxiety that come with 
precarious labour neither halt at factory gates nor in front of playful office 
buildings, home offices, cafes or co-working spaces. Neither do long working 
hours. While extremely low wage levels often leave electronics assembly 
workers little choice but to increase their salary through regular overtime work 
(SACOM 2011a, 9), for a graphic designer it might be the attachment to her 
products or the passion for her work that compels her to put some extra hours 
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into an already badly paid project (Ross 2006/7, 28, Gill 2010, Gill and Pratt 
2008, 18).  
 
The different reasons for working excessive hours illustrate how capital 
mobilises the particular needs and desires of different workers while achieving 
the common goal of maximizing the amount of extracted labour time. 
Furthermore the dependency of assembly workers on fluctuating orders from 
brand companies that result in alternate periods of little work and extreme 
overwork (SACOM 2012, 3) don’t seem very different from the “bulimic patterns 
of working” experienced by many freelance artists, designers or journalists (Gill 
and Pratt 2008, 14).  
 
Another commonality is the tendency to exploit the badly paid or unpaid labour 
of interns, who are eager to increase their chances of succeeding within highly 
competitive labour markets. In a 2014 report the Sutton Trust estimated that at 
any time 21,000 interns are working for free in the UK. Ball, Pollard and Stanely 
(2010, 209) in a survey among more than 3,500 graduates in art, design, crafts 
and media subjects found that 42% were undertaking unpaid work to gain work 
experience since graduating (Ball, Pollard and Stanely 2010, 209). Badly paid 
internships are not unique to creative professions.  In electronics manufacturing 
in China hiring student interns is particularly common during peak season to 
cover the sudden labour demand (SACOM 2012, 6). Students, who often are 
required to complete and internship as part of their education at a vocational 
school, are cheaper to employ since they do not receive regular social security 
benefits and are not covered by labour laws. SACOM’s research however shows 
that like regular workers they are working night shifts and overtime (SACOM 
2011a, 18). According to SACOM in 2010 100,000 vocational school students 
from Henan province were sent to work at a Foxconn electronics factory in 
Shenzhen to complete a 3-month internship (SACOM 2011b, 3). 
 
Shared experiences of work pressure, anxiety, long hours and exploitation could 
create a shared interest in co-ordinated resistance grounded in cross-occupation 
and transnational solidarity. Overall, what unites these workers is that their 
labour benefits a transnational capitalist class (Sklair 2001) of cultural sector 
corporations and that they in one way or another are confronted with some form 
of precarity.  
 
Marx‘s notion of the collective worker as an “aggregate worker” whose 
“combined activity results materially in an aggregate product” (1867/1990, 
1040), highlights the connectedness of different forms of work. Emphasizing this 
connectedness he argued that even though “the spreading-out of the work over 
great areas and the great number of people employed in each branch of labour 
obscure the connection” the product of each work “is merely a step towards the 
final form, which is the combined product of their specialized labours” (Marx 
1867/1990, 475).  Contemporary Marxist theorists have a adapted Marx’ 
concepts to global capitalism speaking of the “world collective worker” 
(Weltgeamtarbeiter) (Haug 2009) or the “global worker” (Roth and van der 
Linden 2009, Dyer-Witheford 2014) 
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The economic success of companies such as Google or Apple would be 
unthinkable without either the conceptual work of software engineers and 
designers, the manual labour assembly plant workers and mineral miners, the 
support work of call centre workers, unpaid prosumer labour or the care and 
reproduction work that keeps the corporate engine going. Together they form, a 
cultural “producer composed of different limbs and organs from around the 
world” (Lebowitz 2011, 254), the global cultural worker. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
In this chapter I argued for an inclusive approach to cultural labour in digital 
capitalism: such a perspective avoids a “cultural idealism” (Williams 1977, 19) 
that ignores the materiality of culture; takes into account the interconnectedness 
of technology and content; recognizes the importance of the global division of 
labour, avoiding Western-centrism; confronts the myth of weightlessness and 
immateriality of digital culture; is important to acknowledge the environmental 
and social impact of (digital) cultural industries; and can inform political 
solidarity.  
 
In addition, considering the totality of digital cultural production on a global 
scale can confront fetishized and naturalised accounts of the particular form the 
social division of labour takes in contemporary capitalism. If the critical analysis 
of (digital) cultural labour wants to go beyond suggesting sectoral improvements 
for this or that group of workers it needs to problematize the very fact that the 
relatively privileged creative work of those cultural workers who use digital 
technologies as their means of production, depends on physically strenuous, 
repetitive and monotonous labour.  
 
An inclusive approach to digital cultural labour thus culminates in a critique of 
capitalist digital culture that rests on a complete division between manual and 
mental labour. Such a division deprives the work of those producing key cultural 
technologies from its foreseeing and creative elements, which Raymond Williams 
described as essential qualities of human work: “The specifically human 
character of work includes […] not only the foreseeing concept of what is being 
made but ideally integrated concepts of how and why it is being made. […] it is 
reasonable to describe certain forms of human work – those in which the 
workers has been deprived, by force or by the possession by others of his means 
and conditions of production, of the necessary human qualities of foresight, 
decision, consciousness and control – as degraded or sub-human, in no 
hyperbolic sense” (Williams 1990, 204). Already Marx stressed that “what 
distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is that the architect builds 
the cell in his mind before he constructs it in wax. At the end of every labour 
process, a result emerges which had already been conceived by the worker at the 
beginning, hence already existed ideally” (Marx 1867/1990, 284). Likewise 
William Morris, a key figure of the 19th century arts and crafts movement, argued 
that work is only worthy if it makes daily use of creative skills: “Worthy work 
carries with it the hope of pleasure in rest, the hope of the pleasure in our using 
what it makes, and the hope of pleasure in our daily creative skills. All other 
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work but this is worthless; is slaves’ work - mere toiling to live, that we may live 
to toil” (Morris 1888/1973, 88).   
 
Multinational corporations control the production of digital cultural 
technologies. The organisational form of the value chain allows them to disperse 
”each value adding activity to geographic locations that optimize labour costs, 
access to raw materials, or proximity to markets“ (Dyer-Witheford 2014, 67) 
High profit margins are sustained by keeping labour costs at a minimum. 
Kraemer, Linden and Dedrick  (2011) for example calculated that in 2010 Apple 
kept 58.5% of the sales price of an iPhone, while only 1.8% were spent for the 
labour cost for final assembly in China. For the iPad Chinese labour costs 
amounted to 2%, and Apple’s profits to 30% of the sales price (Kraemer, Linden 
and Dedrick 2011, 5).  These political economic structures perpetuate degraded 
and sub-human work in the production of advanced computer technologies that 
resemble the early days of industrial capitalism.   
 
Further technological progress and automation might help to reduce the amount 
of repetitive, hard and monotonous labour needed to produces information and 
communication technologies. Herbert Marcuse for example argued that “the 
technological progress of mechanization and standardization might release 
individual energy into a yet uncharted realm of freedom beyond necessity” 
(Marcuse 1964, 2).  However, the way advanced computer technologies are 
produced today illustrates that realising this potential requires broader social 
transformations. Marx, who also stressed the potential of technological 
development to alleviate labour (Marx 1867/1990, 667), realised that the 
progressive potential of the development of productive forces is constrained by 
capitalist relations of production: “all the means for the development of 
production undergo a dialectical inversion so that they become means of 
domination and exploitation of the producers; […] they degrade [the worker] to 
the level of an appendage of a machine, they destroy the actual content of his 
labour by turning it into a torment; they alienate [entfremden] from him the 
intellectual potentialities of the labour process” (Marx 1867/1990, 799).  While 
technological advancement and further automation is needed to reduce 
“unworthy work” and “useless toil” (Morris 1888/1973, 88), it is not enough. The 
transformation of work and the transcendence of exploitation and alienation is 
thus not a result of “techno-scientific development” alone as theorists of the 
information revolution claimed, but requires social struggles. A global solidary 
movement is needed to confront transnational corporate power. Highlighting the 
connectedness of the various parts of digital cultural production which together 
compose the global cultural worker is thus essential because, in the words of 
Nick Dyer Witheford, “To name the global worker is to make a map; and a map is 
also a weapon” (Dyer-Witheford 2014, 175). 
 
A global solidary movement could evolve around demands for the worldwide 
reduction of the working week and the introduction of legal minimum wages, a 
more just distribution of work and division of labour, safe and secure 
workplaces, the abolition of degraded and inhumane forms of work, the 
introduction of a guaranteed basic income, worldwide laws against child-labour, 
ending unpaid internships, universal access to health care, social security 
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systems that grant both flexibility and security, as well as an expansion of 
alternative practices that confront exploitation and alienation and strengthen 
self-determination and democracy at work such as the expansion of 
collaborative workplaces and worker owned and controlled co-operatives.  
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